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It is widely assumed by philoso-
phers that the main task of moral 
philosophy is to provide a general 
theory of morality. Moral philoso-
phy will provide us with the cor-
rect distinction between right and 
wrong action, or between good 
and bad behavior, or between 
virtuous and vicious character. 
Right, wrong, good, bad, virtuous 
and vicious are the central con-
cepts in morality. The job of phi-
losophy is to sort out their mean-
ing and relations. The central 
concepts are thus a very small 
set of so-called “thin” concepts.  
 
Some virtues theorists object 
that this is an unduly narrow ap-
proach to the subject. They wish 
to introduce a richer repertoire, 
the repertoire of the virtue and 
vice concepts. For them the task 
of moral philosophy is to make 
sense of good and bad character 
and action in terms of the recog-
nized range of virtues and vices, 
such as kindness, courage, fair-
ness, honesty and justice. This is 
indeed an enriched approach – 
but is it rich enough? 
 
We might go much further. Sup-
pose we were to collect a whole 
lexicon or thesaurus of moral 
terminology. How rich would it 
be? Oddly enough, no-one seems 
to have done this. I have seen 
suggestions that it would be quite 
small. My own amateur attempts 
suggest otherwise. I have a list of 
100 terms for morally wrong ac-
tions, including relative rarities 
such as buckpassing, whitewash-
ing, stalking and racketeering, 
but not forgetting core concepts 
such as murder, theft, rape, 
fraud and assault. Admittedly, we 
seem to have fewer terms for 
good actions. But Edmund Pin-
coffs (in Quandaries and Virtues) 
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showed that we have a rich rep-
ertoire of good and bad character 
concepts. 
 
This approach might be deemed 
the “thick” method of doing 
moral philosophy. It rests on the 
indisputable idea that we already 
have a considerable stock of 
moral distinctions. But what work 
does it leave for moral philosophy 
to do? Does it reduce the philoso-
pher to mere stamp collecting? In 
fact there is much to do, given 
this idea of moral philosophy. The 
central task is that of making 
sense of our moral lexicon. It re-
quires that we interpret the 
meanings and relations that hold 
within and between these con-
cepts. It also requires that we set 
these concepts in the wider con-
text of our other concepts and of 
the social institutions and prac-
tices that employ these concepts. 
 
In fact this “thick” approach is a 
widely practiced approach to 
moral philosophy, but one that 
lacks the status of the general 
theories and theorists. And few 
philosophers have attempted to 
put together a general account of 
moral concepts, as distinct from 
a general theory of morality. One 
exception is the Hungarian-born 
Australian philosopher, Julius 
Kovesi. In his 1967 book Moral 
Notions, Kovesi set out to explore 
how moral concepts are con-
structed, how they are used, and 
how they relate to our other con-
cepts. His main general point is 
that they are in no way special 
except in that their content is 
moral content. 
 
Kovesi’s central idea was what 
he called the “formal element” of 
concepts. This idea is somewhat 
similar to what Wittgenstein 
meant by the “rule-following” as-
pect of how we use concepts in 
practical life. Similar, but not 
quite the same. A better transla-
tion of what Kovesi meant is “the 
reason why we have the con-
cept”. Concepts are formed be-
cause we need to make distinc-
tions. We have a reason to make 
them. For example, the concept 
of manslaughter arises from our 
need to distinguish some kinds of 
wrongful killing from other kinds. 
Concepts thus structure what 
counts as a reason in our shared 
lives. Concepts are not just forms 
of rule-following. They have ra-
tional force. 
 
Kovesi distinguished the formal 
element of a concept from its 
“material elements”. The mate-
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concepts. Each concept 
has a role to play. Take 
one away and our ca-
pacity for moral func-
tioning is to that degree 
weakened. Moral phi-
losophy has to be 
“thick”. What then of 
our “thin” concepts? 
Kovesi had an answer 
to that question. Some 
of our thin concepts, 
good and bad, serve as 
very high level discrimi-
nators. “Good” is the 
most general term of 
approbation. Other thin 
concepts play a role in 
moral reasoning. 
“Right” and “wrong” 
play a part when we are 
debating about an ac-
tion that does not fall 
directly under any of our 
existing repertoire of 
concepts. In general the 
thin concepts play a supplemen-
tary role in moral thought, and 
not a central role, as many moral 
philosophers assume. 
 
Moral Notions had a strong influ-
ence on a few philosophers, and 
no influence at all on many. To 
those for whom his work mat-
tered it seems to still matter. 
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rial elements are the various 
ways in which the concept can be 
instantiated. There are innumer-
able ways in which murders can 
be committed. Likewise, there 
are innumerable kinds and exam-
ples of tables or games or plants 
or whatever. At present there 
may be only 118 known chemical 
elements, but it is important that 
the set is not closed – new ele-
ments may still be discovered. 
This openness is a general fea-
ture of concepts, Kovesi thought. 
And this implies that we cannot 
grasp the meaning of a term sim-
ply by listing instances or kinds of 
the term, even if the list is correct 
as far as it goes. We need to 
grasp not just what the list’s 
members have in common but 
what would make some addi-
tional example a genuine or false 
example. And to grasp this we 
need to go back to the formal 
element, to the reason why we 
have the concept. A digital book 
has little in common with a paper
-based book but it is still a book, 
because the formal element is 
the same. 
 
Kovesi’s argument was intended 
to break down the distinction 
between fact and value that has 
so dominated moral philosophy. 
Values enter into the formation of 
our concepts, while “facts” so-
called play only a secondary role. 
There is no defined set of facts 
that accounts for the meaning of 
any given concepts. What gives 
our concepts meaning is the 
shared values that inform them. 
Values and reasons go together 
in structuring the concepts that 
shape our lives. 
 
Kovesi’s moral philosophy shows 
why we need a rich repertoire of 
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Amongst them are some well-
known names: Bernard Harrison, 
Peter French, Bob Ewin, Jean 
Bethke Elshtain, and Dennis Pat-
terson. A collection of papers by 
these authors and others de-
signed to re-introduce Kovesi’s 
distinctive contribution to moral 
philosophy has recently been 
compiled by Brian Mooney and 
Alan Tapper, under the title 
Meaning and Morality: Essays on 
the Philosophy of Julius Kovesi 
(Brill, 2012). Alasdair MacIntyre 
once described Moral Notions as 
“a minor classic of moral philoso-
phy”.  
 
The collection aims to make sure 
it is not a forgotten minor classic. 
http://www.brill.com/meaning-
and-morality 
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